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NOTES 
SNAP JUDGMENT:  
RECOGNIZING THE PROPRIETY AND PITFALLS 
OF DIRECT JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE 
AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Denise K. Barry* 
 
Conflicting results in two recent police excessive force decisions by the 
U.S. Supreme Court—Tolan v. Cotton and Plumhoff v. Rickard—have sown 
confusion about the standards for summary judgment.  This Note shows 
how the two decisions are consistent with each other and with longstanding 
summary judgment precedents.  The key insight is that since the Second 
Circuit’s iconic 1946 decision in Arnstein v. Porter, appellate judges, 
including Supreme Court Justices, have listened to audio recordings, 
scrutinized artwork, and—as in the case of Plumhoff—watched video 
footage in order to decide for themselves whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact for trial.  These “objective” components of the record are 
considered vitally important to the decisions.  When no objective evidence 
is available, appellate judges are left with “he said, she said” testimonial 
evidence in which demeanor evidence looms larger and are therefore more 
likely to allow the cases to proceed to trial.  The presumed propriety of 
appellate judicial review of audiovisual evidence not only explains the 
different results in Tolan (no audiovisual evidence of police shooting and 
vacating the lower court’s finding for the defendant officer) and Plumhoff 
(video evidence of a police car chase resulting in the Court finding for the 
officer), but it also will  have greater significance in current police 
excessive force cases given the omnipresence of smartphones and police 
recordings.  At the same time, it is worth questioning whether appellate 
judges should continue to exercise limitless, de novo review of present-day 
audiovisual evidence, which may require as much understanding of context 
as traditional demeanor evidence. 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2002, University of 
Pennsylvania.  I would like to thank Professor Thomas H. Lee for his guidance and advice 
during the writing process.  I would like to thank my family for their love and 
encouragement, and especially John, for his support through everything, law school and 
beyond. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down two decisions 
involving complaints of excessive force by police officers where the 
officers had moved for summary judgment1 on the basis of qualified 
immunity.2  Tolan v. Cotton3 and Plumhoff v. Rickard4 both had tragic facts 
and circumstances, and the confrontations between the plaintiffs and the 
police ended in permanent disability in Tolan5 and in two deaths in 
Plumhoff.6  In Tolan, the Court vacated the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant police officer.7  Because it was the first 
time in ten years that the Court had ruled against an officer in a case 
involving summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, civil rights 
advocates celebrated Tolan as a small but notable victory.8  By contrast, in 
Plumhoff, the Court reversed the lower courts, which had both denied 
summary judgment to the defendant officer on qualified immunity 
grounds.9 
This Note proposes that the key to understanding these two seemingly 
inconsistent cases is the importance of audiovisual evidence and the 
presumptive right of appellate judges, including U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 1. Summary judgment is “granted on a claim or defense about which there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and on which the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of 
law. . . .  This procedural device allows the speedy disposition of a controversy without the 
need for trial.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1664 (10th ed. 2014). 
 2. Qualified immunity is a “judicially-created doctrine that often protects public 
officials from damages actions for the violation of constitutional rights.” Alan K. Chen, The 
Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 229 (2006).  The test for qualified 
immunity is two pronged, and inquires first “whether the facts, ‘[t]aken in the light most 
favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer’s conduct violated a [federal] 
right.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2013) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 
194, 201 (2001)).  The second prong asks “whether the right in question was ‘clearly 
established’ at the time of the violation.” Id. at 1866 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 
739 (2002)). 
 3. 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014). 
 4. 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014). 
 5. See Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1864. 
 6. See Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2018. 
 7. See Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1868. 
 8. See Will Baude, Tolan v. Cotton—When Should the Supreme Court Interfere in 
‘Factbound’ Cases?, WASH. POST (May 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/07/tolan-v-cotton-when-should-the-supreme-court-interfere-
in-factbound-cases; Garrett Epps, Supreme Court:  Police Can’t Brutalize Your Elderly 
Mother, ATLANTIC (May 8, 2014, 2:17 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/ 
archive/2014/05/supreme-court-police-cant-brutalize-your-elderly-mother-or-shoot-you-
when-youre-unarmed/361934/; Maxwell S. Kennerly, The Supreme Court’s Results-
Oriented Summary Judgment Precedent, LITIGATION&TRIAL.COM (June 6, 2014), 
http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2014/06/articles/attorney/civil-rights-1/results-oriented-
summary-judgment/. 
 9. See Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2024; Estate of Allen v. City of W. Memphis, 509 F. 
App’x 388, 392 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 2012; Estate of Allen v. 
City of W. Memphis, Nos. 05-2489, 05-2585, 2011 WL 197426, at *9–10 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 
20, 2011), aff’d, 509 F. App’x 388 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 
2012. 
3346 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Justices, to review such evidence de novo10 when reviewing a trial court’s 
grant or denial of summary judgment.  In Tolan, the record on appellate 
review was completely testimonial, while in Plumhoff, the record included 
video recordings of the confrontation between the plaintiff and the police.  
In cases where the record includes audiovisual evidence pertaining to 
disputed factual or mixed factual issues (e.g., whether the use of force by 
police is reasonable under the circumstances), appellate judges have 
consistently gone to the record and decided for themselves whether there is 
a genuine issue of material fact that makes the case trial worthy.  When the 
record is purely testimonial—the “he said, she said” kinds of cases—
appellate judges are more likely to view the facts in the plaintiff’s favor and 
to allow the case to proceed. 
Two iconic decisions set the foundation for this key distinction between 
testimonial and audiovisual evidence at summary judgment.  The key 
precedent for the Tolan decision is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1970 decision 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress,11 the quintessential “he said, she said” summary 
judgment case.12  Plumhoff’s antecedent is the 1946 decision of a 
distinguished panel of Second Circuit judges in Arnstein v. Porter.13  The 
majority in Arnstein, over the objection of Judge Charles E. Clark, the 
former dean of Yale Law School and the principal architect of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure,14 held that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact for trial in a copyright infringement case after listening to the musical 
recordings in dispute.15  Tolan, like Adickes, was remanded for trial because 
it was a testimonial case.  Plumhoff was summarily decided by the Justices 
after they independently assessed the video evidence in the case, just as the 
Arnstein court had listened to the audio evidence (albeit to a different 
result). 
This Note explores the contours of the longstanding appellate practice of 
evaluating “objective” audiovisual evidence on summary judgment motions 
and argues that this practice—and the Justices’ questionable confidence in 
their own powers of perception—led to opposing results in Tolan and 
Plumhoff.  Part I explores the modern history and development of summary 
judgment and, using landmark summary judgment cases, examines courts’ 
routine assessment of audiovisual evidence in rendering summary judgment 
decisions.  Part II examines the Tolan and Plumhoff decisions in detail and 
briefly reviews their effects on lower court cases.  Part III continues this 
analysis by illustrating how Tolan and Plumhoff can be reconciled by 
 
 10. De novo translates to “anew,” and means that an appellate court will review the 
record and any evidence without deference to the trial court’s decision. See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 528, 976 (10th ed. 2014). 
 11. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 
 12. The record in Adickes consisted entirely of witness testimony. See id. at 153–58. 
 13. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 14. See Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 85 YALE. L.J. 914, 915 (1976); see also Fred Rodell, For Charles E. Clark:  A 
Brief and Belated But Fond Farewell, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (1965) (noting that as 
dean, Clark revolutionized legal education). 
 15. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469, 473. 
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acknowledging the Court’s dispositive resort to audiovisual evidence in the 
Plumhoff record.  Part III concludes by urging judges reviewing a record to 
recognize the limits of their own powers of cognition in assessing 
deceptively objective audiovisual evidence. 
I.   THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Part I of this Note examines the history and development of summary 
judgment.  Part I.A addresses the origin and purpose of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, particularly the purpose and function of Rule 56, which 
governs summary judgment in federal courts.  Part I.B examines the 
“slightest doubt” standard employed by courts prior to 1986 and looks to 
two landmark cases, noting the courts’ treatment of the record in their 
decisions.  Part I.C goes on to examine the summary judgment “trilogy” of 
1986—important Supreme Court opinions that changed the standard by 
which courts analyze summary judgment motions.  Part I.D looks at three 
post-trilogy decisions, two copyright infringement cases in which courts 
based their decisions on the objective record, and then Scott v. Harris,16 a 
summary judgment qualified immunity decision where video played a 
starring role in the Supreme Court’s opinion.  Part I.E concludes with a 
survey of the responses to the summary judgment trilogy and the use of 
visual images or audiovisual recordings in courts’ decisions. 
A.   Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  Enactment and Purpose 
In 1938, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“the Rules”), Rule 56 of which governs summary judgment.17  As stated 
by the Rules Committee, “[T]he very mission of the summary judgment 
procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see 
whether there is a genuine need for trial.”18  When a party moves for 
summary judgment, it asserts that “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”19  
 
 16. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 17. Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex:  Reconsidering Summary 
Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 88 (2006).  
Summary judgment has its roots in the common law and was first used in England in 1855. 
Id.  Several states in the United States adopted summary judgment by the end of the 
nineteenth century, and plaintiffs used it on a very limited basis to eliminate “frivolous or 
fictitious Defences.” Id.  Summary judgment was not considered a defendant’s tool. Id. 
 18. See id. at 91 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (1963 
amendment)).  The text of the current Rule states: 
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or 
the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.  The 
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the 
motion. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
3348 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
The goal of Rule 56, and of the Rules as a whole, is “the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”20  
Rule 56 itself provides no specific guidance on how courts should 
determine “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact,” and instead relies on courts to develop these details.21  
Because of this lack of direction, judicial interpretation of Rule 56 has 
played an extremely important role in its development.22  As one 
commentator explains, “The Rule 56 text has endured because its seemingly 
indeterminate standard is problematic only if the text is viewed apart from 
the common-law system in which it operates.”23  The common law, 
anchored by the “iconic rule text,” emerges slowly over time through cases 
on a variety of subject matters, and works to rein in “unguided judicial 
discretion . . . .  It is that combination that makes Rule 56 . . . endure and 
function across a variety of subject matters and of factual patterns within 
the same subject matter.”24 
Although Rule 56 has been amended multiple times since its adoption, 
including substantive textual changes, commentators note that all of the 
changes “were designed to bring the rule in line with reality, to permit the 
text to reflect the manner that summary judgment actually operates.”25  
Because Rule 56’s intentionally protean standard left so much room for 
judicial interpretation, a close parsing of the case law is the best way to 
understand the evolution of the summary judgment standard.26 
B.   The “Slightest Doubt” Standard on Summary Judgment Motions 
In the years immediately after the adoption of the Rules, courts were 
hesitant to grant summary judgment to defendants, opting instead to send a 
case to the jury if there was the “slightest doubt” about material facts.27  
The standard originated in the Second Circuit’s 1945 decision in Doehler 
Metal Furniture Co. v. United States.28  The Second Circuit explained “that 
 
 20. Id. 1. 
 21. Steinman, supra note 17, at 89. 
 22. Lee H. Rosenthal, The Summary Judgment Changes That Weren’t, 43 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 471, 495–96 (2012). 
 23. Id. at 495. 
 24. Id. at 495–96. 
 25. EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT:  FEDERAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE xiii (Supp. 2012).  Specifically, the 1963 amendment added answers to 
interrogatories as items courts can consider in granting a summary judgment motion. See 
Steinman, supra note 17, at 89 n.48.  In 2007, Rule 56 received a “stylistic overhaul,” in line 
with the stylistic changes that all of the Rules received, without substantive changes. See 
BRUNET & REDISH, supra, at xiii.  The 2009 and 2010 amendments included reordering Rule 
56 so that the “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” language begins the Rule, rather 
than coming after the timing requirements; incorporating into the text the procedures of 
partial summary judgment and sua sponte summary judgment; and codifying that a court 
should set forth its reasons for granting or denying summary judgment in an opinion. See id. 
at xxi–xxiii. 
 26. See Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 498. 
 27. EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT:  FEDERAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 6:3, at 127–28 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 28. 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945). 
2015] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE 3349 
trial judges should exercise great care in granting motions for summary 
judgment,” and that “[a] litigant has a right to a trial where there is the 
slightest doubt as to the facts.”29  The court cautioned that although 
summary judgment could be “a praiseworthy time-saving 
device, . . . prompt despatch of judicial business” is “neither the sole nor the 
primary purpose for which courts have been established.”30  The court 
concluded that “[d]enial of a trial on disputed facts is worse than delay.”31 
The Second Circuit coined the term “slightest doubt” after relying on the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp.,32 which 
held that Rule 56 only allowed summary judgment “where it is quite clear 
what the truth is.”33  The Supreme Court further stated that “the purpose of 
the rule is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they 
really have issues to try.”34  The “slightest doubt” standard was viewed as a 
sensible restraint given the overhang of the constitutional right to a jury in a 
civil trial and general enthusiasm about the democratic advantages of a jury 
trial, even in the civil context.35 
1.   Arnstein v. Porter:  An Early Examination of the Audio Record 
The landmark case exemplifying the “slightest doubt” standard is the 
Second Circuit’s 1946 decision in Arnstein v. Porter, decided by an 
esteemed panel consisting of Judges Learned Hand, Jerome Frank, and 
Charles E. Clark.36  In Arnstein, the plaintiff, a musical composer, appealed 
from the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the famous composer 
Cole Porter, whom Arnstein had sued for copyright infringement for 
copying his music.37  The action consisted of two elements:  (1) that Porter 
had copied the work and, (2) assuming that the work had been copied, that 
the copying went so far as to be an improper appropriation of Arnstein’s 
copyrighted work.38  The court explained that in order to prove the first 
element, there must be evidence of copying, either in the form of an 
admission by the defendant, or by a finding of (1) a similarity between the 
 
 29. Id. at 135 (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 321 U.S. 620 (1944). 
 33. Id. at 627. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 6:3, at 136–37. 
 36. See id. § 6:3, at 128 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946)); Alan K. 
Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity:  Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in 
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 63 (1997) (explaining that federal courts have 
relied on the “oft-cited” case of Arnstein, which held that even if the nonmoving party has no 
evidence to rebut the moving party’s evidence, summary judgment may not be granted if 
there exists the “slightest doubt” that there is a genuine dispute of material fact).  For 
additional examples of the general hostility toward summary judgment in federal courts at 
this time, see Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 77–78 (1990). 
 37. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
 38. Id. 
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copyrighted material and the alleged copy and (2) evidence that the 
defendant had access to the copyrighted material.39 
If the plaintiff established the copying element, then the court would test 
the improper appropriation element by using the standard of an “ordinary 
lay hearer.”40  The court was clear that “[e]ach of these two issues—
copying and improper appropriation—is an issue of fact.  If there is a trial, 
the conclusions on those issues [are for] the trier of the facts.”41  
Nevertheless, in order to determine whether the fact-finder should be 
permitted to make these findings, the judges listened to the recordings 
themselves, holding that the similarities between the recordings, standing 
alone, were not so dispositively compelling as to permit the inference of 
copying.42  However, the court did hold that the similarities were sufficient 
enough to the judges’ ears that the case should go to trial, assuming there 
was sufficient evidence of Porter’s access to Arnstein’s compositions.43  
Therefore, Porter’s summary judgment motion was dependent on Arnstein’s 
evidence that Porter had access to Arnstein’s compositions.44  The court 
held that summary judgment should only be granted if it was clear that 
Porter absolutely did not have access to the compositions at issue.45 
Reviewing the record before it, the Second Circuit noted that the district 
court had depositions from Arnstein and Porter regarding the access Porter 
may or may not have had to Arnstein’s compositions.46  The Second Circuit 
stated that issues of credibility must always be left to the jury, recognizing 
that if, after listening to the testimony of both parties, the jury did not 
believe Porter’s denials, it could “reasonably infer access . . . .  It follows 
that, as credibility is unavoidably involved, a genuine issue of material fact 
presents itself.”47  The court further explained that cross-examination at 
trial in front of the fact-finder was an important tool for determining 
credibility, for which depositions were a poor substitute.48  On this issue, 
the court held that summary judgment should not be granted.49 
The court went on to examine the second element of the action, whether 
to the “ears of lay listeners,” Porter appropriated something that belonged to 
Arnstein.50  Stating that this was a question of fact properly suited for the 
jury, the court listened to the compositions and held that it did not find the 
similarities in the pieces so “trifling” as to find for the defendant Porter.51  
Based on its own assessment of the audio evidence and acknowledging that 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 469. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 469–70. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 472–73. 
 51. Id. at 473.  The court in dicta went so far as to suggest that in the case of a bench 
trial, the judge should employ an “advisory jury” to help determine this issue. Id. 
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Arnstein’s testimony might be convincing to a jury, the court held that it 
could not grant summary judgment for Porter.52 
The Second Circuit judges therefore independently evaluated the 
compositions for their similarities—a question for the fact-finder—while 
also advocating that testimonial disputes are for the jury’s determination.53 
Judge Clark’s dissent is notable not only for its disapproval of the 
majority’s “dislike of the summary-judgment rule,”54 but also for its 
position that the court was mistaken in deciding the issue of improper 
copying using “the judicial eardrum [that] may be peculiarly insensitive.”55  
Clark declared that the majority’s rejection of expert testimony as “utterly 
immaterial” in determining whether the songs were copied constituted 
“final proof of the anti-intellectual and book-burning nature of [the 
majority’s] decision.”56  Judge Clark, advocating for the use of expert 
witnesses to determine copying in musical copyright infringement cases, 
was equally skeptical of the lay jury’s role as a fact-finder, thinking they 
lacked competence.57  He concluded that if judges and juries were to listen 
to musical compositions themselves to determine plagiarism, judicial and 
musical “chaos” would result.58 
2.   Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.:  
Establishing Burdens with Testimonial Evidence 
In the seminal 1970 civil rights case of Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., the 
Supreme Court denied the defendant summary judgment because he had 
“the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any of material 
fact.”59  Further, according to the Court, the defendant had failed to 
foreclose the possibility that the jury could find for the plaintiff.60  Because 
Adickes placed a high burden on the moving party, the case can be seen as 
reaffirming the Supreme Court’s approval of the “slightest doubt” test and  
exhibiting a preference for jury trial over summary judgment.  Some 
commentators have opined that this may have been due to the civil rights 
context of the case.61 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. See generally id. 
 54. Id. at 479 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 476. 
 56. Id. at 478. 
 57. Id. at 478–79. 
 58. Id. at 480. 
 59. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).  In addition to its 
significance as a civil rights case, Adickes is widely regarded as a landmark summary 
judgment opinion. See John E. Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment:  Reconciling Celotex 
v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REV. LITIG. 
227, 229 (1987) (describing the “landmark” case); Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment:  
Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC. 433, 439 (1987) (calling Adickes one 
of the Supreme Court’s most important cases on summary judgment). 
 60. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158. 
 61. See 10B Charles Alan WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2739, at 393 (3d ed. 1998) (“[T]here may be some question 
whether Adickes would have been decided the same way if it had been a routine tort or 
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In Adickes, a white school teacher brought a claim against Kress, the 
owner of a restaurant in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, to recover damages under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her constitutional rights.62  Adickes went 
to Kress’s restaurant with six African American students; the restaurant 
served the students but refused to serve Adickes.63  Upon leaving the 
restaurant, the Hattiesburg police arrested Adickes for vagrancy.64 
Adickes alleged that Kress and the police had conspired to deprive her of 
her right to equal treatment and to cause her arrest for the false charge of 
vagrancy.65  According to Adickes’s complaint, a police officer came into 
the restaurant and observed her being refused service, and then he and 
another officer later arrested her on the street once she left the restaurant.66  
Adickes argued that, although she had no knowledge of an agreement 
between a restaurant employee and the police, “the sequence of events 
created a substantial enough possibility of a conspiracy to allow her to 
proceed to trial.”67  The crux of the claim was that the police officer had 
been in the restaurant and that his mere presence was enough for a 
reasonable fact-finder to infer a conspiracy between restaurant staff and the 
police.68 
In his motion for summary judgment, Kress argued that the facts 
established that there was no agreement between himself and the police.69  
In support of this assertion, Kress submitted a deposition from the store 
manager stating that he had not communicated with the police and that he 
had ordered the waitress to refuse Adickes service for fear of starting a riot 
if Adickes was served.70  Kress also submitted affidavits from the 
Hattiesburg chief of police and the two arresting officers, all denying that 
anyone in the restaurant had requested that Adickes be arrested.71 
Adickes’s opposing evidence consisted of an unsworn statement by a 
cashier at the restaurant that the cashier had seen the police officer in the 
 
contract case, rather than a civil-rights suit . . . .”); see also Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on 
Summary Judgment:  Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 770, 779 (1988) (“Adickes can be explained in that it was an important civil rights case 
that the Court did not want to dispose of without trial.  The discussion of summary judgment 
was simply a means of masking a difficult substantive issue.”). 
 62. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 146.  Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 
 63. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 146–47. 
 64. Id. at 146. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 156–57. 
 67. Id. at 157. 
 68. See Kennedy, supra note 59, at 235. 
 69. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 153. 
 70. Id. at 153–54. 
 71. Id. at 154–55. 
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restaurant while Adickes and her students were there,72 as well as Adickes’s 
assertions in her complaint and deposition that the officer was at the 
restaurant while she and her students were there.73  Adickes stated that 
although she had not personally seen the police officer, two of her students 
had, and both had testified to this at an earlier trial.74  Despite this 
(inadmissible) evidence, Adickes pointed out that Kress had failed to 
dispute that the police officer had been in the restaurant.75  The Court found 
this failure to dispute the police officer’s presence fatal to Kress’s motion 
because, as the moving party, Kress had the burden of showing the absence 
of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and, viewing the record in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it was possible that the police 
officer had been in the restaurant and party to a conspiracy.76  Although not 
quoting the phrase “slightest doubt,” the Court’s language implied a “fairly 
high burden on parties moving for summary judgment.”77 
Adickes also underscores the differences between the burdens of the 
parties in a motion for summary judgment as opposed to a motion for a 
directed verdict.78  A directed verdict is “[a] ruling by a trial judge taking a 
case from the jury because the evidence will permit only one reasonable 
verdict.”79  If this dispute had occurred during the trial instead of during the 
pretrial stage, Adickes would have the burden of production,80 which is the 
“duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by 
the fact-finder.”81  The significance of these burdens is that if the case had 
gone to trial, Kress would have been granted a directed verdict without 
producing any evidence of his own, provided that Adickes failed to meet 
her burden of production.82  Instead, although Adickes had not met the 
burden of production, Kress’s motion for summary judgment was denied 
because Kress had failed to disclose the possibility that Adickes could meet 
that burden.83 
 
 72. Id. at 156 n.14. 
 73. Id. at 156. 
 74. Id. at 156 n.13.  Adickes had brought two § 1983 claims against Kress:  the 
conspiracy claim, which was disposed of pretrial on a motion for summary judgment, and a 
claim that she had been deprived of service because of “discriminatory custom.” Id. at 147–
48.  The latter claim went to trial and was held for Kress on a directed verdict. Id.  One 
commentator notes that the trial on the discriminatory custom claim put the Supreme Court 
in an awkward position, and could possibly influence how Adickes should be understood, 
because at the trial Adickes had presented evidence sufficient to support the conspiracy 
count. Kennedy, supra note 59, at 234 n.22.  Therefore, if the Court granted summary 
judgment for Kress, it would be holding Adickes’ evidence insufficient, which had already 
been admitted at trial. Id. 
 75. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 156. 
 76. See id. at 157. 
 77. Chen, supra note 36, at 58 (emphasis added). 
 78. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 5:3, at 94. 
 79. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1791 (10th ed. 2014). 
 80. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 5:3, at 94. 
 81. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (10th ed. 2014). 
 82. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 5:3, at 94. 
 83. See id.; Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial:  
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1342–43 (2005) (explaining 
that “[f]or all practical purposes,” although Adickes would have the burden of production at 
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In sum, Adickes held that Kress, the moving party, had the initial burden 
of demonstrating that there was no genuine dispute of material fact.84  
Additionally, when reviewing the arguments set forth by the movant, all 
facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.85  Because Kress “failed to show conclusively that a fact 
alleged by [Adickes] was ‘not susceptible’ of an interpretation that might 
give rise to an inference of conspiracy,” the burden of producing evidence 
never shifted to Adickes.86 
C.   The Summary Judgment Trilogy and the Emergence of a New Standard 
Sixteen years later, in 1986, the Supreme Court decided three summary 
judgment cases—known as the trilogy—which are widely regarded as 
effecting a sea change in summary judgment doctrine.87  The result was a 
purposeful retreat from the anti-summary judgment approach so clear in 
Arnstein and Adickes.88 
1.   Celotex Corp. v. Catrett:  Lightening the Movant’s Burden 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett89 altered the 
evidentiary burdens on the respective parties on a motion for summary 
judgment from those that the Court had earlier endorsed in Adickes.90  In 
this wrongful death case, the Supreme Court addressed the purpose of the 
summary judgment motion, noting that courts should not regard summary 
judgment as a “disfavored procedural shortcut” and must uphold the rights 
of defendants to avoid an unnecessary trial where the case is devoid of any 
factual basis.91 
The Court explained that Adickes should not “be construed to mean that 
the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to produce 
evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with 
respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of 
 
the trial, she could produce “absolutely no evidence that a jury could ever see to support that 
allegation” at the summary judgment stage, and further noting that, at trial, Kress could point 
out Adickes’s lack of evidence and be granted a directed verdict). 
 84. Mullenix, supra note 59, at 441. 
 85. Adickes v. S.H. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970). 
 86. See Mullenix, supra note 59, at 445 (quoting Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160 n.22). 
 87. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 36, at 58; Friedenthal, supra note 61, at 771; Issacharoff 
& Loewenstein, supra note 36, at 73. 
 88. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:  Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1028 (2003) (noting that “the 1986 Supreme Court 
trilogy is striking because of the strong pro-summary judgment language found throughout 
the Court’s three opinions”).  Miller goes on to propose that “the mere fact that the Court 
discussed the motion in depth in three cases during the same Term makes the trilogy 
significant, suggesting that the subject may well have been on the agenda of some of the 
Justices,” and concludes that “there is no doubt that the decisions break with the Court’s 
prior attitude in . . . Adickes.” Id. at 1028–29. 
 89. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 90. See Issacaroff & Loewenstein, supra note 36, at 79. 
 91. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. 
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proof.”92  Instead, after adequate time for discovery, a motion for summary 
judgment should be granted “against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”93  
Further, the moving party does not have to support its motions with 
evidence; it is sufficient for the moving party to inform a court of the basis 
for its motion in the record, including the nonmoving party’s lack of 
evidence.94 
In sum, because under Celotex the movant must simply point to the 
nonmovant’s lack of evidence in the record, the burden on the movant is 
generally accepted as “light,” as compared to the movant’s burden under 
Adickes.95 
2.   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.:  
Equating Summary Judgment to Judgment As a Matter of Law 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.96 equated the summary judgment 
standard to the standard for a judgment as a matter of law (formerly called a 
directed verdict).97  Additionally, Anderson held that a court must evaluate 
the issue of the genuine dispute of material fact in light of the evidentiary 
burden that the party would carry as established by the substantive law.98 
In Anderson, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant magazine libeled 
him, and the issue for the Court was whether the heightened evidentiary 
standard required by the substantive libel law—clear and convincing 
evidence99 of actual malice—should affect a judge’s weighing of a motion 
for summary judgment.100  Framed another way, the question was whether 
a movant should get a bonus at the summary judgment stage because the 
nonmovant faced a tougher standard at trial.101  The Court affirmatively 
stated that a trial judge must “bear in mind the actual quantum and quality 
of proof necessary to support liability” and consider a heightened 
 
 92. Id. at 325. 
 93. Id. at 322. 
 94. Id. at 323. 
 95. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 5:8, at 118. 
 96. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 97. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 6:4, at 147–48; Chen, supra note 36, at 64. 
 98. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). 
 99. “Clear and convincing evidence” is defined as “[e]vidence indicating that the thing 
to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (10th 
ed. 2014). 
 100. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247. 
 101. See id. at 266–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I am fearful that this new rule . . . will 
transform what is meant to provide an expedited ‘summary’ procedure into a full-blown 
paper trial on the merits.”).  Justice Brennan goes on to state the burden that the plaintiff will 
bear at the pretrial stage because of this heightened evidentiary standard: 
It is hard for me to imagine that a responsible counsel, aware that the judge will be 
assessing the “quantum” of the evidence he is presenting, will risk either moving 
for or responding to a summary judgment motion without coming forth with all of 
the evidence he can muster in support of his client’s case. 
Id. at 267. 
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evidentiary standard when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.102  In 
doing so, the Court was equating the summary judgment motion to that of a 
directed verdict.103 
By equating the evidentiary standard at summary judgment to that of 
judgment as a matter of law, the Court held that a nonmoving party must 
“shoulder[] a trial evidentiary standard” at the pretrial stage.104  The Court 
stated that the difference between the two motions was merely a 
“procedural” timing issue, because summary judgment motions are made 
before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while judgments as a 
matter of law are made at trial and decided on admitted evidence.105  
Although some commentators have noted the significant differences 
between the quality and completeness of the record at the pretrial and trial 
phases with disapproval, others have embraced the equated standards as 
true to the purpose and function of summary judgment.106 
3.   Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.:  
No Doubt Left—The “Slightest Doubt” Standard Extinguished 
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,107 the final 
case of the trilogy, Zenith Radio Corporation, an American corporation 
producing televisions sets, brought an antitrust action against the Japanese 
company Matsushita.108  Zenith alleged that Matsushita had entered into a 
scheme to sell its televisions at an expensive price in Japan while selling its 
televisions at a low, fixed price in the United States in an effort to drive 
Zenith out of the American market.109 
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether Zenith had established a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Matsushita had entered into a 
conspiracy.110  The Court reaffirmed that the dispute must be genuine and 
that the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is 
 
 102. Id. at 254 (majority opinion). 
 103. Id. at 250. 
 104. Mullenix, supra note 59, at 451. 
 105. Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251). 
 106. Compare Kennedy, supra note 59, at 232–34 (arguing that there are significant 
differences between prejudging the evidence at the summary judgment stage and at trial), 
and D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution:  A Summary Judgment on 
the Supreme Court’s New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 37–39 
(1998) (positing that summary judgment creates a “special problem” for judges because the 
record is not finalized and the judge must make a determination of what the record would 
look like at trial and then apply the sufficiency standard, and also that the Court disregarded 
significance of the cost of preparing this evidentiary record pretrial), with BRUNET & REDISH, 
supra note 27, § 6:4, at 148 (arguing that the “fundamental . . . purpose of summary 
judgment is to avoid an unnecessary trial” and that “[t]he motion would hardly be 
performing its intended function if courts were to show greater leniency toward the 
nonmovant in ruling on a summary judgment motion than in ruling against a party who 
moves for a directed verdict”). 
 107. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 108. See id. at 576–78. 
 109. See id. at 577–78. 
 110. See id. at 585–86. 
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some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” thereby rejecting the 
“slightest doubt” standard.111 
Evaluating the record, the Court held that the court of appeals erred and 
that summary judgment should have been granted for Matsushita because a 
predatory pricing conspiracy would be “unlikely to occur” and was 
irrational.112  The Court reasoned that “in light of the absence of any 
rational motive to conspire, neither [defendants’] pricing practices, nor their 
conduct in the Japanese market, nor their agreements respecting prices and 
distribution in the American market, suffice to create a ‘genuine issue for 
trial.’”113 
Along with putting to rest the “slightest doubt” standard, the Matsushita 
decision affirmed the Court’s willingness to use summary judgment.114  
The net intent and effect of the 1986 trilogy was to send the message to the 
lower courts that they should be much more comfortable about granting 
summary judgment than they had been under the Adickes precedent and the 
“slightest doubt” regime. 
D.   Post-Trilogy Summary Judgment Decisions 
This section discusses three important post-trilogy summary judgment 
decisions where appellate courts assessed de novo audiovisual evidence—
musical recordings, works of art, and videotape, all considered part of the 
objective record—in deciding summary judgment motions. 
1.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.:  The Court Listens to Rap Music 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,115 a landmark case regarding 
copyright infringement, is recognized for its revitalization of the copyright 
law doctrine of “fair use.”116  However, it is also notable for the Court’s 
 
 111. See id. at 586 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 590. 
 113. Id. at 597. 
 114. BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 6:4, at 140.  Matsushita is also notable because 
the Court evaluated Zenith’s expert’s testimony and found it unpersuasive, a role 
traditionally reserved for the fact-finder. See id. § 6:4, at 141 (“[T]he question is not whether 
the Court finds [plaintiffs’] experts persuasive . . . ; it is whether, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to [plaintiffs], a jury or other fact finder could reasonably conclude that 
[defendants] engaged in long-term, below-cost sales.” (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 606) 
(White, J., dissenting)); see also Mullenix, supra note 59, at 459 (“Such language suggests 
that a judge hearing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case should 
go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the 
weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff.” (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 600) (White, J., 
dissenting)).  For further reading on the role of expert testimony in summary judgment, see 
Bobak Razavi, Admissible Expert Testimony and Summary Judgment:  Reconciling Celotex 
and Daubert after Kochert, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 307 (2008). 
 115. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 116. See Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose:  Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 
13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 19 (1994); Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of 
Me?:  Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 
305 (1993).  The fair use doctrine states that certain copyrighted materials can be used 
without infringing upon the author’s rights. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990).  The idea was first articulated by Justice 
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heavy reliance on the record in deciding a motion for summary judgment, 
including direct analysis of music and rap lyrics by the Supreme Court.117 
In 1989, rap group “2 Live Crew” released a rap version of Roy 
Orbison’s 1964 hit song “Oh, Pretty Woman.”118  Acuff-Rose, who owned 
the copyright to the original song, brought an action against the group for 
copyright infringement.119  2 Live Crew had asked Acuff-Rose for 
permission to parody the song; Acuff-Rose refused permission, but 2 Live 
Crew recorded and released the song anyway.120  Acuff-Rose alleged that 
“2 Live Crew’s music was substantially similar in melody to ‘Oh, Pretty 
Woman’ and the lyrics of the first verse are substantially similar to that of 
the original version,” and in response, Campbell moved for summary 
judgment.121  The district court noted that before evaluating the claim on its 
merits, it must decide whether the case was appropriate for summary 
judgment, and although Acuff-Rose contended that issues of material fact 
made summary judgment inappropriate, the court held that it had sufficient 
facts to decide the issue as a matter of law because the evidence included 
“copies of the songs, correspondence and affidavits.”122 
In order to decide the case on the merits of the substantive law, the 
district court listened to and compared the two songs, including the lyrics, 
musical devices such as drum beat and base riff, and the musical key of the 
song.123  Evaluating the song for these and other factors, the court granted 
summary judgment for the defendant, holding that 2 Live Crew’s song was 
a parody constituting permissible fair use.124 
However, the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision.125  The 
intellectual property doctrinal issue was simple:  2 Live Crew claimed that 
their song was more than a mere imitation of the Roy Orbison song, and 
that both the words and music of the composition were “classic 
parodies.”126  Acuff-Rose asserted that 2 Live Crew’s version was only a 
copy of the original, and that “even a listener without musical training 
would readily discern” that 2 Live Crew’s song was modeled after the 
original.127  The court of appeals held that although it could view the song 
 
Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), and later codified 
in 17 U.S.C. § 107. Id. at 1105–06.  Essentially, the fair use doctrine limits the power of 
copyright protection as long as a court finds that the copyrighted material is being used for 
“generally educational or illuminating purposes,” which includes criticism and commentary, 
and which a court determines on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1110–11. 
 117. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583. 
 118. Id. at 572. 
 119. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1151–52 (M.D. Tenn. 
1991), rev’d sub nom. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), 
rev’d, 510 U.S. 569. 
 120. Id. at 1152. 
 121. Id.  Acuff-Rose also claimed that 2 Live Crew’s version of “Oh, Pretty Woman” was 
inconsistent with good taste and would lessen the value of the copyrighted original. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1153. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1158–59. 
 125. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 972 F.2d at 1439, rev’d, 510 U.S. 569. 
 126. Id. at 1433. 
 127. Id. 
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as a parody of “white-centered popular music,” its imitation of the original 
song was too substantial to be justified as a parody.128  The court therefore 
concluded that 2 Live Crew’s song was outside of the protection of the 
parody defense and denied summary judgment.129 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if 2 Live Crew’s song 
was a parody and therefore protected as fair use under the 1976 Copyright 
Statute.130  Holding that the court of appeals gave “insufficient 
consideration . . . to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of 
copying,” the Supreme Court reversed.131  Noting that no bright-line rule 
existed in determining parody and that the doctrine called for a case-by-case 
analysis, the Court examined the pertinent factors.132  This examination 
required the Court to compare the two audio recordings and lyrics in order 
to determine the “purpose and character of the use” and “the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole.”133  The Court stated that it must evaluate 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty 
Woman” for “whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.”134  
Comparing the two works, the Court held that 2 Live Crew’s song 
“reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing 
it.”135 
In support of this assertion, the Court included the lyrics of both songs in 
the appendices to its opinion.136  As to the amount and substantiality of the 
portion copied, the Court held that 2 Live Crew’s song “departed markedly” 
from the original and produced “otherwise distinctive sounds.”137  
Ultimately, the Court remanded the case because of an infirmity in the 
record.138  Nevertheless, the Court clearly based its findings regarding the 
 
 128. Id. at 1435 n.8. 
 129. Id. at 1439. 
 130. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574–75.  The statute provides that when analyzing fair use, 
the factors to be considered shall include: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such 
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
Id. at 576–77 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV)). 
 131. Id. at 572. 
 132. Id. at 577–78. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 582. 
 135. Id. at 583. 
 136. See id. at 594–96. 
 137. Id. at 589. 
 138. Id. at 590–94.  The Court held that 2 Live Crew failed to adequately address the 
fourth factor of the fair use inquiry—“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work,” which it was instructed to do upon remand. Id. at 590 
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (4) (1988 & Supp. IV)). 
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substance of the songs on its own direct understanding and interpretation of 
the songs after listening to them.139 
2.   Rogers v. Koons:  Art Critics Sitting on the Second Circuit 
Rogers v. Koons,140 a 1992 Second Circuit case decided on cross-motions 
for summary judgment, is another fairly recent example of appellate judges’ 
willingness to evaluate the record directly, in this instance with respect to 
contemporary art.141  In Rogers, a commercial photographer brought an 
action against famed artist Jeff Koons for copyright infringement.142  
Rogers had taken a photograph of a client with his wife and eight German 
shepherd puppies.143  “Puppies” became part of Rogers’s catalog, and he 
exhibited the piece a number of times.144  Rogers eventually licensed 
“Puppies” to a company that produced notecards and postcards, and the 
company produced approximately 10,000 notecard prints of “Puppies.”145 
Koons created his sculpture, “String of Puppies,” based off of a 
“Puppies” notecard as part of a gallery exhibit called the “Banality 
Show.”146  Koons instructed sculptors in Italy to copy the photograph when 
creating the sculpture.147  The puppies of the sculpture were painted various 
shades of blue, their noses bulbously enlarged, and flowers were added to 
the hair of the human figures.148 
Koons admitted that he had based his large sculpture on a photograph 
taken by Rogers, used without permission, but he claimed that it was a work 
of parody, protected under the fair use exception to copyright 
infringement149 (and later validated by the Supreme Court in Campbell).150  
The Second Circuit found that there was no dispute of material fact 
 
 139. See id. at 593–94.  It is interesting to note that the Court’s analysis of the record by 
direct interpretation, specifically the meaning and intent of rap lyrics, is not limited to civil 
cases (as examined in this Note) but has been extended to criminal cases. See Adam Liptak, 
Chief Justice Samples Eminem in Online Threats Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2014, at A14.  
The Court recently heard oral arguments for Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014), 
addressing the question of whether prosecutors had proven the defendant’s intent through his 
lyrics, and if his lyrics could constitute “true threats,” outside of First Amendment 
protection. Id.  Chief Justice Roberts quoted lyrics from Eminem in which Eminem seems to 
threaten to drown his wife, and then the Chief Justice asked the government lawyer if 
Eminem could be prosecuted for them. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47–48, Elonis, 134 S. 
Ct. 2819 (No. 13983). 
 140. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 141. Id. at 303–06.  This foray into art criticism by the legal system did not go unnoticed 
by the art world, and the issues of the case could be seen as echoing the controversy 
surrounding Koons generally:  Is he a genius or a commercially driven imposter? See 
Constance L. Hays, A Picture, a Sculpture and a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1991, at B1. 
 142. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 303–04. 
 143. Id. at 304. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 304–05. 
 148. Id. at 305, 308. 
 149. Id. at 308–12. 
 150. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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regarding the fair use exception.151  The court based this holding on the 
record before it, which included postcard-sized black and white 
photographs of both works.152  Central to this holding was the question of 
“the amount and substantiality of the work used,” which Koons claimed did 
not exceed the level permitted by the fair use doctrine.153  The court 
declared that “[h]ere, the essence of Rogers’ photograph was copied nearly 
in toto, much more than would have been necessary even if the sculpture 
had been a parody of plaintiff’s work.”154  The court concluded that “it is 
not really the parody flag that appellants are sailing under, but rather the 
flag of piracy.”155  Accordingly, the Second Circuit granted summary 
judgment in favor of Rogers.156 
3.   Scott v. Harris:  The Videotape Wrinkle 
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Scott v. Harris relying on a police 
chase videotape in the trial record as a basis for granting summary 
judgment.157  In Scott, Victor Harris alleged an excessive force violation 
when Deputy Timothy Scott, pursuing Harris’s vehicle, hit the rear of 
Harris’s car in an effort to end a high-speed car chase.158  When Scott hit 
Harris’s car, Harris lost control of his car and was flipped off the road, 
rendering him a quadriplegic.159 
To determine whether Scott used excessive force, the district court first 
examined the question of “whether the officer[’s] actions are ‘objectively 
reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [him], 
without regard to [his] underlying intent or motivation.”160  After analyzing 
the facts in the light most favorable to Harris, the district court held that 
given the nature of Harris’s offense, among other factors, a reasonable fact-
finder could determine that it was unreasonable for Scott to believe that 
Harris posed a threat to others and that it was unreasonable for Scott to 
pursue Harris in a high-speed chase and eventually to bump him.161 
 
 151. Rogers, 960 F.2d. at 309. 
 152. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words:  The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 683, 721 (2012). 
 153. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310–11. 
 154. Id. at 311. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 314.  Later commentators contended that the works were substantially different 
and that Koons’s sculpture should be considered a parody. See Tushnet, supra note 152, at 
721 (commenting that the photograph was the size of a postcard, and the sculpture was 
“larger than life and garishly colored”); see also Hays, supra note 141 (explaining the debate 
around Koons’s creation, including details added to the sculpture, and the ongoing 
divisiveness of Koons’s work). 
 157. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007). 
 158. Id. at 375. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., No. CIVA 3:01CV148 WBH, 2003 WL 25419527, at *4 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)), aff’d, 433 
F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott, 550 U.S 372. 
 161. Id. at *4–5.  The district court considered it a “central fact that guide[d]” this case 
that Harris’s crime precipitating the chase was driving seventy-three miles per hour in a 
fifty-five miles per hour zone. Id. at *5.  Similarly, Scott relied heavily on an earlier crash 
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Having established excessive force in violation of the U.S. Constitution, 
the court moved on to evaluate Deputy Scott’s assertion of qualified 
immunity, the pertinent question being “whether Harris’s rights were 
clearly established—that is, whether it would have been clear to a 
reasonable officer that Scott’s conduct was unlawful.”162  The court 
recognized that the law clearly established that the level of force 
appropriate to employ when pursuing a fleeing suspect depended on the 
underlying crime the suspect was believed to have committed.163  Because 
Scott did not know the underlying charge against Harris when he pursued 
him, and because the court must view the evidence in Harris’s favor, the 
court held that there were sufficient differences of material fact precluding 
summary judgment, necessitating a trial by jury.164  The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed this decision, holding that a jury could reasonably believe that 
Scott hitting Harris’s vehicle was a case of excessive force and that the law 
regarding the use of deadly force was sufficiently established to preclude 
qualified immunity for Scott.165 
The Supreme Court disagreed.166  The Court framed the question on 
appeal as “[c]an an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk 
of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from 
endangering the lives of innocent bystanders?”167  Writing for an eight-to-
one majority, Justice Scalia noted that when a defendant moves for 
summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity, the first question 
a court must answer is:  “Taken in the light most favorable to the party 
asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated 
a constitutional right?”168  Beginning this inquiry, the Court noted that 
Harris’s and Scott’s versions of the facts differed substantially, which 
would normally compel the Court to “view the facts and draw reasonable 
inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary 
judgment] motion,’” that is, Harris.169 
However, in this case, a “wrinkle” in the form of a videotape of the chase 
trumped this requirement.170  The Court stated that there was no 
“contention that what [the videotape] depicts differs from what actually 
 
between him and Harris in a parking lot during the pursuit to support the position that the 
chase was objectively reasonable. Id.  Regarding this crash, the court found that if viewing 
the facts in Harris’s favor, as required in the summary judgment analysis, the inference is 
that the crash was either an accident or that Scott hit Harris, as Harris had asserted, rather 
than Harris hitting Scott, as was Scott’s version of the events. Id.  Because the court credited 
Harris’s assertions as the nonmoving party, the court did not infer that Harris was driving 
aggressively. See id. 
 162. Id. at *6 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001)). 
 163. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d 807, 814–15, 820–21 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub 
nom. Scott, 550 U.S. 372. 
 166. Scott, 550 U.S. at 386. 
 167. Id. at 374. 
 168. Id. at 377 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). 
 169. Id. at 378 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). 
 170. Id. 
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happened,” and that the video “clearly contradicts” Harris’s story.171  The 
Court described the videotape as showing Harris’s car “racing” down the 
road in “the dead of night,” driving “shockingly fast” and resembling “a 
Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort.”172  Based on the 
Court’s viewing of the videotape, the Court held that Harris’s version of the 
events was “blatantly contradicted by the record,” so much so that no 
reasonable jury could believe him.173  The Court held that Harris’s version 
of the facts was “utterly discredited” and that the facts should be viewed in 
“the light depicted by the videotape.”174  Therefore, it was no longer 
appropriate to adopt Harris’s version of the facts, despite the usual 
summary judgment procedure.175 
Addressing the question of the objective reasonableness176 of Scott’s 
actions as required by the Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court held that 
“it is clear from the videotape that [Harris] posed an actual and imminent 
threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other 
civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.”177  The Court 
concluded that Scott’s actions were reasonable, holding that, as a rule, a 
“police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that 
threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious 
injury or death.”178  The Court held that Scott was entitled to summary 
judgment and reversed the court of appeals’ decision.179  Notably, the Court 
included a link to the videotape in a footnote to its opinion, stating that the 
Court was “happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself.”180 
Justice Stevens alone dissented, noting that he did not view the videotape 
in the same light that the majority did and neither did the judges on the 
district court and court of appeals.  Based on these disparate views of the 
facts, Justice Stevens believed that the videotape was best viewed by the 
jurors.181 
E.   Commentary on Summary Judgment Through Scott v. Harris 
Commentary on the cases discussed above is helpful in understanding the 
impact of these decisions on the current summary judgment jurisprudence, 
particularly the 2013 cases that are discussed in Part II.  This section 
discusses some of the legal commentary available. 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 379–80. 
 173. Id. at 380. 
 174. Id. at 380–81. 
 175. Id. at 380. 
 176. Once a court determines relevant facts and inferences—drawn in favor of the 
nonmoving party—the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct is strictly a matter of 
law, to be decided by a court, not a jury. Id. at 381 n.8. 
 177. Id. at 383–84. 
 178. Id. at 385–86. 
 179. Id. at 386. 
 180. Id. at 378 n.5. 
 181. See id. at 389–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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1.   Thoughts on the State of Summary Judgment 
Commentators have agreed that the trilogy encouraged the use of 
summary judgment as a method of resolving claims and that the elucidation 
of the standard made it easier for defendants to win the motion.182  Some 
legal scholars have criticized this change, most notably Arthur R. Miller183 
and Suja A. Thomas.184  Professor Miller notes that the summary judgment 
motion “has taken on an Armageddon-like significance; it has become both 
the centerpiece and end-point for many (perhaps too many) federal civil 
cases.”185  Miller fears that the scope of what judges consider to be a 
“genuine dispute as to any material fact” has been reduced, and that cases 
that should go to trial and be submitted to a jury are being dismissed.186  On 
the other hand, courts have expanded what can be decided “as a matter of 
law.”187  In sum, 
a motion designed simply for identifying trial-worthy issues has become, 
on occasion, a vehicle for resolving trial-worthy issues. . . .  The effect is 
to compromise the due process underpinnings of the day-in-court 
principle and the constitutional jury trial right without any empirical basis 
for believing that systemic benefits are realized that offset these 
consequences.188 
Similarly, Professor Thomas has argued extensively that summary 
judgment is unconstitutional because of the Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial for civil litigants.189  Thomas further contends that summary 
judgment violates the core principles of the common law:  (1) “the jury or 
the parties determine the facts;”190 (2) “a court would determine whether 
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict only after the parties 
 
 182. See Chen, supra note 36, at 58 (“These cases reflect the Court’s desire to enhance 
judges’ use of summary judgment in eliminating claims before trial, and have arguably led to 
a greater capacity for resolving cases in this manner.”); Issacaroff & Loewenstein, supra 
note 36, at 73–74 (calling the trilogy a “weapon to the arsenal designed to check the spread 
of litigation” and stating that the Court “significantly expanded the applicability of summary 
judgment”). But see Friedenthal, supra note 61, at 787 (commenting that none of the 
decisions have been overly “clear and precise”).  Friedenthal also notes that although the 
trilogy should generally encourage summary judgment, their effect could be limited because 
of the dissents to each opinion and the history of the Court “deciding one summary judgment 
case one way, only to return later with an opinion leaning the other way.” Id. at 771. 
 183. See generally Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and 
Trials on the Merits:  Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 286 (2013); Miller, supra note 88. 
 184. See generally Suja A. Thomas, Summary Judgment and the Reasonable Jury 
Standard:  A Proxy for a Judge’s Own View of the Sufficiency of the Evidence?, 97 
JUDICATURE 222 (2014) [hereinafter Thomas, Reasonable Jury]; Suja A. Thomas, Why 
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007) [hereinafter Thomas, 
Unconstitutional]. 
 185. Miller, supra note 183, at 311. 
 186. Id. at 311–12. 
 187. Id. at 312. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Thomas, Unconstitutional, supra note 184, at 140. 
 190. Id. at 159–60. 
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presented evidence at trial, and only after a jury rendered a verdict;”191 and 
(3) “a jury, not a court, decided a case that had any evidence, however 
improbable, unless the moving party admitted all facts and conclusions of 
the nonmoving party, including the improbable facts and conclusions.”192 
2.   Viewing the “Objective Record”:  Specific Concerns About Images, 
Audiovisual Evidence, and Judicial Interpretation 
The use of photographic or other pictorial evidence has also attracted 
attention from commentators.193  Hampton Dellinger argues against their 
inclusion in Supreme Court opinions, cautioning that pictures are especially 
dangerous because of their assumed neutrality and accuracy.194  Dellinger 
asserts that written opinions are subjected to analysis and skepticism that 
purportedly objective visual evidence in the record is not.195  Even if an 
image is not purposely manipulated in any way, visual images have an 
immediate impact on a viewer, oftentimes affecting subjective emotions.196  
Dellinger argues that “[p]ut simply, a visual attachment, like the words that 
precede it, should be viewed as an opinion.”197  Quoting Justice Holmes, he 
warns that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only 
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations.”198 
Professor Nancy Marder objects to Dellinger’s proposition that images 
should not be included in Court opinions, contending that images can be 
especially helpful to readers when the Justices explain (1) why they selected 
the included images and (2) how they interpret what the images depict.199  
Weighing the advantages and harms of using pictures in opinions, Marder 
concludes that on balance the practice should continue (as she assumes it 
will), but that “[t]he use of images should convey information that words 
alone cannot convey.  The point is to foster discussion and debate, not to 
obscure it.”200  While Dellinger fears that the Justices (like the readers of 
their opinions) will be led astray by their visceral reactions to images,201 
 
 191. Id. at 160. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See generally Hampton Dellinger, Words Are Enough:  The Troublesome Use of 
Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV 1704 
(1997); Nancy S. Marder, The Court and the Visual:  Images and Artifacts in U.S. Supreme 
Court Opinions, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (2013). 
 194. Dellinger, supra note 193, at 1707. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1708. 
 197. Id. at 1710. 
 198. Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)). 
 199. See Marder, supra note 193, at 332. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Dellinger, supra note 193, at 1707 (noting that the “manipulable properties of 
attachments—including color, angle, size, and perspective, as well as the inevitable 
exclusion of critical context—can individually or in combination result in a particularly 
subjective version of the ‘facts’”).  Dellinger goes on to suggest that “[t]he Court’s reliance 
on these atypical depictions may contribute, in turn, to the formulation of questionable legal 
arguments and conclusions.” Id. 
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Marder implicitly approves of the Justices using them to inform their 
“understanding of the case, just as the briefs and oral argument did.”202 
The 2007 Scott decision has also received extensive treatment in the legal 
community.203  Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman’s article in 
response to Scott sought to find what the video really says when allowed to 
“speak for itself” by showing it to 1350 viewers of various backgrounds.204  
Although a substantial majority agreed with the way the Court viewed the 
tape, many viewers did not, and by categorically considering those views 
“unreasonable,”205 the authors argue that the Court (1) denied those citizens 
the opportunity to sit on a jury and possibly change the views of fellow 
jurors, (2) delegitimized the Court’s own holding to the subcommunity who 
perceived the facts differently than the Court did, and (3) pushed the 
“unreasonable” viewers to the position of “defeated outsiders.”206 
Kahan and his coauthors further argue that social sciences teach us that 
while we are aware of other people’s cognitive biases, “our power to 
perceive it in ourselves tends to be quite poor.  We thus simultaneously 
experience overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of the factual 
perceptions we hold in common with our confederates and unwarranted 
contempt for the perceptions associated with our opposites.”207 
The authors hypothesized that the theoretical grounds on which the 
viewers would “see” the tape differently were the culpable control model of 
blame, the theory of identity-protective cognition, and cultural cognition of 
risk.208  The culpable control model of blame theory asserts that people 
attribute blame to others when their actions are viewed as voluntary and 
result in harm to another.209  However, people tend to perceive 
“voluntariness” when someone is acting outside of social norms and that 
there is “a subconscious desire to form blame attributions that accord with 
moral evaluations of the agent’s character or lifestyle.”210  Similarly, 
identity-protective cognition theory proposes that individuals belong to self-
defining groups, therefore adhering to the factual beliefs widespread within 
the group, and, as a means of “psychological self-defense, . . . [individuals] 
process information in a selective fashion that bolsters beliefs dominant 
within their self-defining groups.”211  Likewise, cultural cognition of risk 
theory posits that people shape their factual beliefs about risk to conform to 
 
 202. See Marder, supra note 193, at 358. 
 203. See generally Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?  Scott v. 
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009); Thomas, 
Reasonable Jury, supra note 184; Howard M. Wasserman, Video Evidence and Summary 
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utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him.” 
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their “cultural evaluations of putatively dangerous behavior,” which results 
in people “believ[ing] that behavior they find noble is also socially 
beneficial (or at least benign) and behavior they find base is also socially 
harmful.”212 
The survey supported these theories of group cognition of how various 
viewers would see the tapes, and although the majority of the viewers 
agreed with the Court’s holding that the police were reasonable in using 
deadly force in Scott, it is significant that the minority who disagreed were 
not statistical outliers, but rather “connected by a core of identity-defining 
characteristics,” as were those who “formed a view of the facts most 
unequivocally in line with those of the Scott majority.”213 
Ultimately, the authors recommend that a judge engage in a “mental 
double check” when ruling on a motion for summary judgment and imagine 
the juror that would disagree with the judge’s conclusion that there was no 
genuine dispute of material fact.214  If no specific juror comes to mind, it is 
probably fair to decide the motion in the view of Kahan and his 
coauthors.215  In cases where the judge can picture the dissenting jurors 
with “identity-defining characteristics,” such as “demographic, cultural, 
political, or otherwise[, the judge] should stop and think hard.  Due humility 
obliges [the judge] to consider whether privileging her own view of the 
facts risks conveying a denigrating and exclusionary message to members 
of such subcommunities.  If it does, she should choose a different path.”216 
Professor Naomi Mezey builds upon the cognitive shortcomings of 
viewers recognized in the Kahan study and argues that “courts and legal 
actors lack a critical vocabulary of the visual, and without visual literacy, 
they are more likely to be unduly credulous in the face of images.”217  
Critical of the view that the video “speaks for itself,” Mezey offers a telling 
counterexample to Scott of how visual literacy on the part of attorneys can 
overcome a viewer’s initial response to a powerful video.218  She does this 
by using the Rodney King case, in which a video of white officers beating 
King, an African American man, was broadcast widely.219  Most viewers 
believed that the video spoke for itself, and in the subsequent criminal case 
against the officers, the prosecutors presented the video as central evidence 
in their case.220  In response, the defense attorneys presented a counter 
narrative of the event by showing parts of the video in slow motion and still 
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 213. Id. at 879. 
 214. Id. at 898. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 898–99.  Professor Thomas presents a similar argument, suggesting that judges 
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 217. Naomi Mezey, The Image Cannot Speak for Itself:  Film, Summary Judgment, and 
Visual Literacy, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014). 
 218. See id. at 18–21. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. at 18–19. 
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images.221  By presenting these visual details not seen in the real time 
video, the defense was able to imply that the whole video was 
misleading.222  This technique reframed what the “truth” of the image 
was—like an instant replay in a sports game—and presented the narrative 
of the truth as the defense wanted it told.223  Mezey concludes that “[t]he 
jury acquitted the officers involved in the Rodney King beating because the 
defense employed a more sophisticated visual literacy,” and, although this 
manipulation of the images “did not make them right, . . . it made them 
better lawyers.”224 
Regardless of the literacy of those using and viewing video, video will 
only become more predominant in the legal context given modern 
technological trends.  As noted by Professor Howard Wasserman, the 
ubiquity of video recording devices could be a powerful tool for all litigants 
in civil rights enforcement, potentially allowing the public to hold the 
government accountable for officer misconduct.225  Recognizing that 
recorded evidence is important both at the “front end”—the public’s 
recording of police activity—and at the “back end”—the recordings’ 
evidentiary use—Wasserman proposes that the right of individuals to 
videotape police actions should be protected under the First Amendment, 
and that recordings should be used as proof in civil rights litigation with an 
understanding of video’s probative and prejudicial value.226 
II.   CONFLICT IN THE SUPREME COURT’S 2013 TERM 
Having explored the use of summary judgment in the courts to date, Part 
II examines two notable cases decided during the Supreme Court’s 2013 
Term, Tolan v. Cotton and Plumhoff v. Rickard, and the subsequent federal 
cases that have relied heavily on them.  Both cases were decided on 
summary judgment in the lower courts and subsequently vacated or 
reversed by the Supreme Court.227  Both cases were brought by plaintiffs 
alleging excessive force by police officers in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment where the officers moved for summary judgment based on the 
doctrine of qualified immunity.228  Commentators have noted that the 
judgments appear irreconcilable because in Tolan, the Court ruled against a 
police officer in a qualified immunity case for the first time in ten years,229 
“arguably signal[ing] a major change in attitude.”230  In Plumhoff, however, 
 
 221. See id. at 19. 
 222. See id. at 20. 
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Ct. 2012, 2016–17 (2014). 
 228. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1865, 1868; Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2016–17. 
 229. See Baude, supra note 8. 
 230. Ed Brunet & John Parry, Guest Post:  Brunet and Parry on Tolan v. Cotton, CIV. 
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the Court overruled the lower courts and upheld the officer’s qualified 
immunity and, “to put it simply, . . . gave the plaintiff no quarter.”231 
The Court’s analysis in Tolan was particularly noteworthy because after 
both lower courts had concluded that there was no genuine dispute of 
material fact and that the case could be decided on summary judgment, the 
Court remanded the case with the (not so gentle) reminder that when 
deciding a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, it is the 
summary judgment requirement that the evidence be viewed “in the light 
most favorable to the [nonmoving] party” that guides the qualified 
immunity query.232  The Court held that it was imperative that courts 
import facts into their analysis viewed in the appropriate manner and that 
they must not conduct the qualified immunity inquiry using facts crediting 
the defendant officer’s position.233  In this case, the lower courts had done 
just that, according to the Tolan Court.234  When the Court correctly viewed 
the facts in the light most favorable to Tolan, it held that there were 
disputes, therefore making the case inappropriate for dismissal at the 
pretrial stage.235 
In contrast, both the district court and court of appeals in Plumhoff had 
held that the genuine dispute of material facts surrounding the 
circumstances of the Plumhoff car chase precluded summary judgment, but 
the Supreme Court analyzed the facts of the case in three paragraphs, 
finding no dispute that would merit a trial.236  The Court did not 
acknowledge the plaintiff’s assertions of factual disputes, seemingly in 
contrast to the direction it gave in Tolan.237 
Part II.A looks at the Court’s opinion in Tolan and its application of 
summary judgment, and Part II.B examines Plumhoff.  Finally, Part II.C 
briefly discusses subsequent federal cases that have relied heavily on Tolan 
or Plumhoff, making note of the effect that video (or the lack thereof) had 
on the courts’ analyses. 
A.   Tolan v. Cotton:  Testimonial Disputes 
Robbie Tolan brought an action against police sergeant Jeffrey Cotton for 
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.238  Cotton shot 
 
guest-post-brunet-and-parry-on-tolan-v-cotton.html; see also Kennerly, supra note 8 
(“Frankly, I don’t think there’s a way to reconcile Tolan with Plumhoff on the legal 
principles involved.  Both cases presented multiple factual issues that should have been 
resolved by a jury, and thus summary judgment should not have been granted in either.”); 
Howard M. Wasserman, Mixed Signals on Summary Judgment, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (asserting that the Court’s handling of Tolan and Plumhoff was 
“procedurally confounded”). 
 231. Kennerly, supra note 8. 
 232. See Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 
157 (1970)). 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See id. at 1866–67. 
 236. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2016–17, 2024 (2014). 
 237. See id. at 2021–24. 
 238. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863. 
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Tolan three times, and one bullet punctured Tolan’s lung and lodged in his 
liver.239  Cotton moved for summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity.240  The Supreme Court related the facts of the case, based on 
testimonial accounts, as follows. 
At approximately 2 a.m. on December 31, 2008, police officer Edwards 
was patrolling Bellaire, Texas.241  Edwards observed a sport utility vehicle 
turn quickly down a residential street and park in front of the home 
belonging to Bobby and Marian Tolan, Robbie Tolan’s parents.242  Edwards 
entered the license plate number of the SUV into a computer in his squad 
car, but he entered an incorrect digit, which coincided with that of a stolen 
vehicle.243  This led Edwards, as well as the rest of the police units that had 
been automatically notified by the squad car computer, to believe that 
Edwards had identified a stolen vehicle.244 
Meanwhile, Tolan and his cousin Anthony Cooper had exited the car and 
were heading toward the Tolans’ residence, where Tolan lived with his 
parents.245  Edwards exited his car and drew his pistol, accused Tolan and 
Cooper of stealing the car, and ordered them to the ground.246  Tolan 
protested, explaining that it was his car but did lie down on the front porch 
of his home.247  At this point, Tolan’s parents came out to the front yard in 
their pajamas.248  Tolan’s father told Tolan and Cooper to comply with 
Edwards’s orders and to be quiet, and they did.249 
Tolan’s parents then explained to Edwards that Tolan was their son, that 
Cooper was their nephew, and that this was their home and car.250  With 
Tolan and Cooper on the ground, Cotton arrived at the scene and drew his 
pistol, and Edwards informed Cotton that Tolan and Cooper were the 
suspects.251  Tolan’s mother told Cotton that this was her home and that the 
car belonged to her and her husband.252  Cotton then told Mrs. Tolan to 
stand against the garage door, to which she responded, “[A]re you kidding 
 
 239. Id. at 1864; Ed Lavandera, Questions Surround Shooting of Baseballer’s Son, 
CNN.COM (Jan. 8, 2009, 2:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/01/08/baseballer.shot/ 
index.html. 
 240. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id.  The lower court record includes the names of Tolan’s parents, Marian and 
Bobby Tolan, as well as his cousin, Anthony Cooper. See Tolan v. Cotton, 854 F. Supp. 2d 
444, 449 (S.D. Tex. 2012), aff’d, 713 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 1861. 
 243. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id.  “Tolan’s father explained, with his hands in the air, ‘[T]his is my nephew.  This 
is my son.  We live here.  This is my house.’  Tolan’s mother similarly offered, ‘[S]ir this is 
a big mistake.  This car is not stolen. . . .  That’s our car.’” Id. (quoting Record at 2059, 
2075, Tolan, 134 S. Ct. 1861). 
 251. Id. at 1863–64. 
 252. Id. at 1864. 
2015] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE 3371 
me?  We’ve lived her[e] 15 years.  We’ve never had anything like this 
happen before.”253 
Mrs. Tolan and Cooper testified that, at this point, Cotton grabbed Mrs. 
Tolan and slammed her against the garage, causing her to fall, and leaving 
bruises on her arms and back for days.254  Tolan also testified that Cotton 
pushed his mother.255  According to Cotton’s testimony, he escorted 
Tolan’s mother to the garage door, and she told him not to touch her.256 
Tolan testified that when he saw his mother pushed, he rose to his 
knees.257  Cotton and Edwards testified that Tolan rose to his feet.258  There 
is no dispute that at this point Tolan exclaimed, from about fifteen to twenty 
feet away, “[G]et your fucking hands off my mom.”259  Cotton then fired 
three shots at Tolan with no verbal warning.260 
The district court granted summary judgment for Cotton, holding that 
“although there are disputes about details and interpretations of the facts, 
there are no disputes of material fact.”261  Further, the court found that, 
given the facts of the situation, Cotton’s actions were objectively reasonable 
and therefore not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.262  The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed, holding that Tolan did not meet his burden to establish 
that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether an objectively 
reasonable officer in Cotton’s situation would believe that deadly force was 
necessary.263  Therefore, the court held that Cotton did not violate a clearly 
established right.264 
Tolan appealed from the judgment and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reviewed the record.265  In its opinion, the Court announced 
that “[i]n articulating the factual context of the case, the Fifth Circuit failed 
to adhere to the axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, 
‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable 
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”266  The Court went on to state that 
this rule is “not a rule specific to qualified immunity; it is simply an 
application of the more general rule that a ‘judge’s function’ at summary 
judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter 
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’”267  In making 
the determination of whether there is no genuine dispute of any material 
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fact, a court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the 
opposing party.”268  Because the context of the situation is very important 
in determining a qualified immunity case, the Court pointed out that courts 
must be careful not to import genuinely disputed facts as part of the case’s 
“context.”269 
The Court identified four facts that the appellate court had imported into 
their analysis in favor of the moving party.270  First, the Fifth Circuit 
credited Cotton’s testimony that the shooting scene was dimly lit and that 
the front porch light was decorative, rather than illuminative, contrary to 
Tolan’s father’s testimony.271  Further, the court also failed to consider the 
two flood lights from the police cruisers and the motion-activated front 
lights that Cotton had testified were lit, as well as Tolan’s testimony that he 
was not in darkness when he was shot.272  Second, the Fifth Circuit held 
that Mrs. Tolan was agitated and out of control and did not credit her 
testimony that although she repeatedly asserted to the officers that a mistake 
had been made, she was not agitated or aggravated.273  Third, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that Tolan was “shouting” and “verbally threatening” 
Cotton when Tolan said, “[G]et your fucking hands off of my mom,” 
despite Tolan’s testimony that he was not screaming and that his words 
were not a threat.274  Fourth, the Fifth Circuit inferred that Tolan was 
moving to intervene and credited Cotton’s testimony that Tolan was on his 
feet, crouching, rather than on his knees, as Tolan testified, at the time he 
was shot.275  In sum, the Fifth Circuit credited the evidence of the party 
seeking summary judgment and failed to credit key evidence presented by 
Tolan.276 
The Court concluded: 
The witnesses on both sides come to this case with their own perceptions, 
recollections, and even potential biases.  It is in part for that reason that 
genuine disputes are generally resolved by juries in our adversarial 
system.  By weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences 
contrary to Tolan’s competent evidence, the court below neglected to 
adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, 
reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving 
party.277 
The Court vacated the decision and remanded it to the Fifth Circuit.278  
Revisiting the case, the Fifth Circuit denied Cotton’s motion for summary 
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judgment on the basis that there was a genuine dispute of material fact and 
remanded the case to the district court.279 
Tolan shows that, despite the shifting of standards resulting from the 
1986 trilogy, courts are still required to credit the nonmoving party’s 
testimony and deny summary judgment when a reasonable jury may find in 
the plaintiff’s favor.  A case such as Tolan, in which all evidence is based 
on the testimonial accounts of witnesses to the event, is reminiscent of 
Adickes (which, perhaps not coincidentally, the Tolan Court cited for the 
proposition that a court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable 
to the opposing party”).280  Tolan exemplifies an instance where adherence 
to the summary judgment procedure laid down by well-settled case law is 
pivotal to the determination of the action. 
B.   Plumhoff v. Rickard:  Video in the Record 
About three weeks later, the Court issued its decision in Plumhoff v. 
Rickard,281 seemingly in direct conflict with Tolan.  In Plumhoff, the Court 
held that defendant Vance Plumhoff was entitled to summary judgment 
based on qualified immunity, reversing the lower courts’ holdings.282  
Plumhoff, like Scott, involved a car chase where Officer Plumhoff pursued 
Donald Rickard; the record included video footage of the incident.283  After 
a traffic stop for a broken headlight, Rickard attempted to evade the police 
by fleeing in his car.284  Rickard was eventually cornered by the police in a 
parking lot, and police shot into the car fifteen times to prevent Rickard’s 
further escape, resulting in Rickard’s and his passenger’s deaths.285  In its 
very brief discussion of the facts of the case, the Supreme Court did not 
refer to the video footage directly, but the lower courts discussed its 
evidentiary value, and the parties referred to it extensively in oral 
arguments.286 
The district court had denied Plumhoff’s motion for summary judgment, 
holding that the officer’s conduct was not objectively reasonable in the 
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context, and finding disputed material facts regarding the circumstances.287  
Specifically, the lower court found four facts in dispute.  First, Plumhoff 
asserted that Rickard had tried to hit him with his car, and Rickard’s estate 
contended that he never made such an attempt.288  The district court noted 
that no evidence of Rickard hitting Plumhoff’s cruiser or another cruiser 
was captured in the video footage.289  Second, after this alleged incident, 
the police officers could be heard on the videos saying that Rickard was 
then guilty of aggravated assault, a felony.290  Rickard’s estate disputed 
whether there were felony charges at this time, and no evidence of the 
aggravated assault was on the video.291  Third, as the chase continued, 
Rickard made a right turn and contact occurred between Rickard’s vehicle 
and a police cruiser, causing Rickard’s vehicle to spin into a parking lot.292  
After this, Plumhoff asserted that Rickard turned his vehicle directly toward 
Plumhoff’s car and hit it head-on.293  Rickard’s estate disputed this and 
argued that his vehicle was still propelled by the momentum of the crash 
when this contact occurred and that the momentum caused this collision.294  
The fourth disputed event occurred shortly after this collision:  at this point 
in the chase, the police cruisers had formed a semi-circle around Rickard’s 
vehicle in an attempt to cut off any means of escape (there was a building 
behind Rickard).295  Rickard reversed his vehicle, and Plumhoff and 
another officer, Evans, exited their vehicles and approached Rickard.296  
Evans pounded on the passenger side window of Rickard’s vehicle with his 
gun in his hand.297  The wheels of Rickard’s vehicle were spinning, and the 
vehicle made contact with a second police car.298  Plumhoff asserted that 
Rickard was “revving” the engine, causing this contact, but Rickard’s estate 
stated that the vehicle was rocking back and forth, which the court should 
not consider as “revving.”299 
Analyzing the question of whether the officers’ actions were objectively 
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, the 
district court held that the undisputed facts did not support a finding that it 
was objectively reasonable for the officers to use deadly force.300  The court 
held that the officers were not in danger when they fired the shots into 
Rickard’s car because none of them were in danger of being hit by 
Rickard’s vehicle, no one believed or suspected that Rickard was armed, 
 
 287. See Estate of Allen, 2011 WL 197426, at *10. 
 288. See id. at *2. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See id. 
 291. See id. 
 292. See id. at *3. 
 293. See id. 
 294. See id. 
 295. See id. 
 296. See id. 
 297. See id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See id. 
 300. See id. at *8. 
2015] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE 3375 
and Rickard had been stopped for a broken tail light.301  Additionally, 
although the defendants argued that Rickard engaged in felonious activity 
during their pursuit, the court recognized that these facts were disputed.302  
Viewing the videotape of the pursuit, and citing Scott for the proposition 
that “on a motion for summary judgment, the court may view the facts in 
the light depicted by videotapes,” the trial court stated:  “The objective 
evidence here, the videos of the chase, would not support a reasonable 
person in concluding that there were aggravated assaults.  Therefore, the 
officers’ conduct was not objectively reasonable, even from the officers’ 
perspective.”303 
The court further asserted that the defendant was equally guilty of the 
dangerous driving behaviors that he attributed to Rickard, which could have 
been prevented had the chase been terminated.304  The district court 
clarified that “dangerous conduct that was solely the product of engaging in 
a high-speed chase cannot serve as the foundation for deadly force.”305  
Further, the disputed facts regarding the aggression of Rickard’s driving 
precluded finding in the defendant’s favor that his use of force was 
objectively reasonable because the facts must be interpreted in the light 
most favorable to Rickard.306 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.307  Noting the case’s similarity 
to Scott, it nevertheless distinguished the facts of the case at hand.308  The 
Sixth Circuit differentiated the case by noting that in Scott, Harris was 
fleeing at high speed with the potential to harm innocent bystanders when 
the deadly force was used, whereas Rickard was surrounded by police and 
at a virtual stop when they opened fire on him.309  Additionally, in Scott the 
police used a maneuver that they knew had the potential to cause serious 
harm but did not necessarily guarantee it, and in this case the police officers 
shot fifteen times at close range, all while being aware that there was a 
passenger in the car.310 
In sum, the Sixth Circuit held that the case at hand was distinguishable 
from Scott because, after viewing the video, the court could not  
conclude that it provides clear support for either the plaintiff’s or the 
defendants’ version of what occurred[, especially in regard] to the degree 
of danger that the officers were placed in as a result of Rickard’s alleged 
conduct.  Unlike in Scott, we cannot conclude that the officers’ conduct 
was reasonable as a matter of law.311   
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Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.312 
Plumhoff appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that Plumhoff’s 
behavior was objectively reasonable both under the Fourth Amendment and 
in light of clearly established law.313  The Court relayed the facts of the 
case in three paragraphs, citing to the district court’s decision and finding 
that Rickard was “swerving through traffic at high speeds,” and that, when 
cornered in the parking lot by the police officers, Rickard’s wheels were 
spinning, indicating that he was using the accelerator.314 
Analyzing the reasonableness of the chase, the Court compared the chase 
to that in Scott, finding that there was no reason to decide this case 
differently.315  That same assertion was made during oral arguments by 
Plumhoff’s counsel that “[j]ust as in Scott v. Harris, the videos in many 
ways speaks [sic] for itself,” and that “[t]he video in many ways—in every 
way, in [his] opinion, shows that this [chase] was dangerous.”316  The Court 
also found Rickard’s driving “outrageously reckless,” holding that “Rickard 
was obviously pushing down on the accelerator” when he was cornered in 
the parking lot.317  Further, according to the Court, the “record conclusively 
disproves” Rickard’s claim that the chase was over when the officers fired 
at Rickard.318  In oral arguments, Justice Breyer noted that “when [he] 
look[ed] at the film, [he] thought well, sure, [Rickard’s] going back to the 
highway,” and although Rickard’s counsel argued that the police knew that 
the chase was over, Justice Breyer “didn’t see any evidence showing that 
preferred or otherwise.”319  Concluding its analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness inquiry, the Court held that given the 
circumstances, “all that a reasonable police officer could have concluded 
was that Rickard was intent on resuming his flight and that, if he was 
allowed to do so, he would once again pose a deadly threat for others on the 
road.”320  The Court held that “it is beyond serious dispute” that Rickard 
caused a grave safety risk to the public, and like in Scott, “the police acted 
reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.”321 
The Court went on to hold that Plumhoff would be entitled to summary 
judgment under the “clearly established” law prong of the analysis, as 
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well.322  Because as of the date of the event “it was not clearly established 
that it was unconstitutional to shoot a fleeing driver to protect those whom 
his flight might endanger,” the Court held that Plumhoff was entitled to 
qualified immunity because the “lengthy, high-speed 
pursuit . . . indisputably posed a danger both to the officers involved and to 
any civilians who happened to be nearby.”323 
Plumhoff, like Scott, demonstrates that the Court at times conclusively 
decides summary judgment motions, even in cases when the lower courts—
or a dissenting Justice—find the facts in dispute and accordingly better left 
for trial.324  In Part III, this Note contends that the Court confidently arrived 
at this conclusion based on its own perception of the facts, made possible 
because of the video record of the events in controversy. 
C.   The Video Effect:  Opinions Relying on Tolan and Plumhoff 
Because Tolan and Plumhoff were so recently decided, only a handful of 
federal cases have relied on them extensively.  However, a brief survey of 
these decisions shows the role that video evidence often plays in courts’ 
decisions and the effects these cases have already had. 
1.   The Tolan Cases 
In Bibbs v Allen,325 Jerry Bibbs brought a complaint against Officer 
Allen, claiming that during a routine traffic stop, Allen tasered Bibbs 
repeatedly and without justification.  Although Allen admitted that he 
tasered Bibbs, the facts of the event were “hotly dispute[d]” by the 
parties.326  Before analyzing the disputed event, the district court noted that 
although Allen’s police car was equipped with an in-car video system, it 
was not working the morning of the encounter.327  Based on the testimonial 
divergence, and heeding Tolan’s directive to view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party asserting the injury, the court declined to grant 
summary judgment to the defendant.328 
In Garcia v. Dutchess County,329 police allegedly used excessive force 
against James J. Healy, Jr., eventually resulting in his death.330  The 
altercation took place in Healy’s home, with no cameras present, and the 
court held that material disputed facts precluded deciding the motion at the 
summary judgment stage.331  The court quoted Tolan for the two-pronged 
qualified immunity inquiry, and specifically that “courts may not resolve 
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genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary 
judgment.”332  Additionally, the court quoted Tolan’s direction that when 
conducting the qualified immunity analysis on a summary judgment 
motion, “courts must take care not to define a case’s ‘context’ in a manner 
that imports genuinely disputed factual propositions.”333  Comparing the 
facts of the case as construed most favorable to the plaintiff, the court held 
that qualified immunity was inappropriate.334 
The final recent case that heavily relied on Tolan in its analysis is King v. 
Glanz.335  Donald Francis King was an unarmed mentally ill man who was 
shot and severely injured by sheriffs after they were called to his home for a 
domestic disturbance.336  The record consisted of testimony from 
eyewitnesses, including the deputy sheriffs at the scene and various 
neighbors, who provided conflicting accounts regarding whether King’s 
hands could be seen, whether it would have been possible for King to be 
hiding a long gun under his coat, and whether King threatened to shoot the 
deputies.337  After reviewing these factual disputes, the court noted that 
Tolan had “recently reiterated that it is reversible error for a court to weigh 
the evidence or resolve any disputed issues in favor of the moving 
party,”338 and that “reaching factual inferences that conflict with the non-
movant’s evidence is contrary to the ‘fundamental principle that at the 
summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of 
the nonmoving party.’”339  The court also quoted Tolan’s reminder that 
“witnesses on both sides come to [the] case with their own perceptions, 
recollections, and even potential biases.  It is in part for that reason that 
genuine disputes are generally resolved by juries in our adversarial 
system.”340  Because of the conflicting witness testimony and factual 
disputes, the court denied summary judgment, holding that a jury must 
determine the facts.341  The court further acknowledged that in order to 
grant summary judgment for the sheriffs, it would have to resolve disputed 
facts in the sheriffs’ favor (specifically, that the sheriffs had reason to 
believe that King was hiding a long gun), which would be inappropriate 
under summary judgment procedure.342 
2.   The Plumhoff Cases 
In Godawa v. Byrd,343 the court granted summary judgment for Officer 
Byrd after Edward and Tina Godawa alleged excessive force resulting in 
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the death of their son, Michael Godawa.344  After oral arguments, the court 
asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Plumhoff.345 
Byrd, who was patrolling on bicycle, had questioned Godawa, who was 
in a vehicle, if he had been drinking.346  Once Byrd approached Godawa the 
officer turned on his lapel camera and recorded their interactions.347  The 
parties agreed that the lapel video recorded the facts of the events, and that 
the facts were therefore undisputed.348  The parties disputed only the 
conclusions, making the matter appropriate for resolution on cross-
motion.349 
Relying on the lapel video, the court held that the evidence established 
that Godawa backed his car over Byrd’s bicycle, almost hitting Byrd, and 
then continued to drive, knocking Byrd onto the hood of the car.350  The 
court noted that the impact is not actually seen on the video but was 
heard.351  After this, “in what was clearly a split-second judgment,” Byrd 
fired at Godawa through the passenger window.352  The court held that 
Byrd’s use of force was objectively reasonable, consistent with Plumhoff’s 
precedent.353  Additionally, the court held that the case was 
indistinguishable from Plumhoff because “the record conclusively disproves 
respondent’s claim that the chase in the present case was already over when 
petitioners began shooting.”354  The court held that in this case, as in 
Plumhoff, “[u]nder the circumstances at the moment when the shots were 
fired, all that a reasonable police officer could have concluded,” was that 
Byrd would continue his flight, endangering other drivers and 
pedestrians.355  Accordingly, the court granted the officer’s motion.356 
In another case involving a car chase by police officers and an allegation 
of excessive force, Small v. Glynn County,357 the court cited both Tolan and 
Plumhoff, and noted that Tolan required the court to take “due care to credit 
contradicting evidence in favor of the Plaintiffs and draw evidentiary 
inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs as the nonmoving party.”358  However, 
the court was blunt about the importance of the video to its decision, 
stating: 
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Very few facts are actually up for dispute.  This is because the Court has 
had the ability, duty really, to watch and hear this tragedy from the 
perspective of no less than four separate dashboard cameras.  Rather than 
flatly accept any attorney’s characterization of the events, the Court has 
watched the videos a multitude of times.359 
The court stated that “[t]he videos capture []better than any brief ever 
could[]” the tense moments of the chase.360  In this case, the low-speed 
chase ended in the death of the driver, Caroline Small, after she was shot by 
a police officer.361 
The court noted that the plaintiff argued that a jury could infer from the 
video evidence that Small had no specific intent to harm anyone during the 
chase and that her flight was a result of the officers’ chase.362  However, the 
court held that 
[e]ven inferring that Small’s ultimate desire was escape and viewing the 
videos in that light, the videos document at multiple junctures why 
reasonable officers would have believed that in her reckless attempt to 
avoid capture, she would hurt them with her car.  The videos as a whole 
show she was determined to continue to elude police . . . .  [T]he videos 
support an objectively reasonable conclusion that probable cause existed 
to believe Small was using her car as a weapon.363 
Comparing this video evidence to the facts of Plumhoff, the court granted 
qualified immunity to the officer.364 
In contrast, the court in Luna v. Mullenix365 came to the conclusion that 
summary judgment should not be granted because the video in a police 
chase supported the plaintiff’s version of the events.366  Noting that Scott 
instructed courts to “view facts in accordance with the video,” the court 
held that the videotapes supported the plaintiff’s assertion that a reasonable 
jury could find that the plaintiff’s driving did not pose an immediate danger 
to other officers or drivers.367  The court noted that the qualified immunity 
analysis requires a court to analyze “particular facts,” facts that the Court in 
Plumhoff found supported the use of deadly force.368  The facts of this case, 
as viewed on the videotapes, were distinguishable from Plumhoff (among 
other cases where deadly force was objectively reasonable), and therefore 
summary judgment was inappropriate.369 
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III.   THE REALITY OF JUDGE AS VOYEUR:  BUT IS IT A GOOD THING? 
The Court’s holdings in Tolan and Plumhoff appear to be in conflict.370  
The Court held that Tolan was inappropriate for summary judgment 
because of genuine disputes of material fact and firmly stated the 
importance of viewing all evidence and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.371  By contrast, the Plumhoff Court 
confidently granted the officer’s motion for summary judgment, reversing 
the lower court’s denial of the motion.372  Notably, findings of disputed 
facts that could affect the qualified immunity analysis had influenced the 
lower court decisions.373  This Note proposes that the difference in the 
decisions is attributable to the type of evidence presented in each case.  The 
testimonial “he said, she said” evidence in Tolan made the case 
inappropriate for summary judgment, while in Plumhoff, the audiovisual 
evidence disposed of disputed facts and allowed the case to be decided by 
motion.  The purported factual disputes of Plumhoff were reconciled 
because the Justices were able to observe the car chase that was the basis 
for the action with their own eyes and ears by watching and listening to the 
police dash camera videos that had recorded it.374  This Note shows that the 
appellate judges’ review of and reliance on audiovisual evidence is firmly 
based in precedent—from Arnstein through Scott.375  Similarly, Adickes 
lays the basis for Tolan, along with the tendency of appellate judges to 
decline to grant summary judgment in cases that rely solely on testimonial 
evidence.376  Part III discusses the contours of this argument. 
As demonstrated by the post-Plumhoff decisions reviewed in this Note,377 
audiovisual evidence will continue to play a significant role in courts’ 
summary judgment decisions.378  However, despite the precedential 
appropriateness of appellate judges’ de novo review of audiovisual 
evidence, its propriety should be questioned.  The consequences of such 
review—and the unavoidably subjective perception that judges bring to 
audiovisual observation—are especially fraught in summary judgment 
motions based on qualified immunity, potentially resulting in decisions with 
great repercussions for civil rights litigation.  Part III concludes that direct 
judicial review of audiovisual evidence should, at the very least, be 
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examined and questioned by the judiciary, and that in most instances this 
review should be left to a jury. 
A.   Tolan Was Vacated and Remanded Because, Like Adickes, All 
Evidence Was Testimonial 
Adickes and Tolan show that regardless of the changes in summary 
judgment standards created by the 1986 trilogy, summary judgment is 
inappropriate when genuine disputes of material fact exist, and these cases 
illustrate that courts are especially likely to find disputes in cases where 
evidence is purely testimonial.  Because judges are prohibited from making 
credibility determinations, cases based on “he said, she said” testimonial 
evidence are difficult to decide on a pretrial motion.379  Tolan’s strong 
directive reminding courts that all facts and inferences must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party380 leads to a high 
likelihood that judges will find a genuine dispute of material fact exists in 
the parties’ motions, requiring a trial where those credibility determinations 
can be made.  Although the 1986 trilogy is generally regarded as pro-
defendant,381 Tolan reinforced the inappropriateness of summary judgment 
in such testimonial cases and reaffirmed a plaintiff’s right to a day in court.  
It is also possible that the Adickes and Tolan Courts were particularly 
sensitive to the potential civil rights violations in these cases and, with only 
testimonial evidence in the record, hesitant to take the decision away from a 
jury who would likely view the evidence with a broader variety of outlooks, 
or at least with perspectives more reflective of their respective 
communities. 
B.   Precedent Establishes the Judicial Audiovisual Review in Plumhoff 
By contrast, the precedential cases upon which the Plumhoff decision is 
grounded show that courts have unhesitatingly looked to the parts of the 
record that they consider objective and have freely interpreted that record 
when determining summary judgment motions.382  Courts have done this 
even when they are deciding a question of fact.  In Arnstein, the Second 
Circuit was adamant that the question of whether the songs in contention 
were sufficiently similar was an issue for the jury, but the judges 
nevertheless listened to the recordings themselves and found the songs 
similar enough to justify a trial (upon the presumption that other elements 
of the action were satisfied).383  While judicial review is necessary to 
decide whether a case should be decided on a motion or whether it is trial 
worthy, the Second Circuit’s decision to listen as “ordinary lay hearer[s]”384 
 
 379. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
 380. See supra notes 266–68 and accompanying text. 
 381. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 382. See supra Part I.B.1, I.D. 
 383. See supra Part I.B.1.  In this particular case the court found other issues necessitated 
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interpretation of this objective record. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 384. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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seems close to intruding on the role of the jury, and the opinion does not 
further describe or define how judges are to listen as “lay listeners.”  The 
judges were not “lay listeners,” but rather highly educated jurists trained in 
litigating such matters.  On the other hand, although the judges were not 
“lay listeners,” there is no reason to believe that they were especially 
qualified to discern subtleties in musical compositions.  As dissenting Judge 
Clark pointed out, the “judicial eardrum” may be “peculiarly 
insensitive.”385  Despite the specialized judicial knowledge that these 
intellectual heavyweights possessed in the field of law, the judges were not 
qualified as musical experts, and yet they eschewed the option of relying on 
expert advice, which could surely have informed their decision.386  The 
judges in the majority forced themselves into a illogical position:  to listen 
to the recordings as “lay listeners,” which they were not, while refusing 
competent assistance from expert witnesses.  Judge Clark’s skepticism of 
his fellow judges’ ability to accurately perceive and interpret the musical 
pieces for similarities echoes later criticisms volleyed at judges who use 
their own perceptions to evaluate the worthiness of visual art and video.387  
The “anti-intellectual and book-burning”388 rejection of the musical 
expert’s assistance is analogous to the current prevalent belief that the video 
“speaks for itself,”389 without need for further visual literacy or skepticism.  
Although Judge Clark did not believe that the jury would have been more 
qualified to evaluate the compositions, his dissent recognized that judges 
may not be the most appropriate arbiters in this case.390 
Similarly, in Campbell and Koons, the issue was whether the works in 
question were allowable under the fair use doctrine, requiring a case-by-
case analysis that could not “be simplified with bright-line rules,”391 (as is 
the qualified immunity analysis), and the appellate judges went straight to 
the sources when making their decisions.392  There was no discussion of 
disputed facts in either case because the courts took for granted that because 
they could experience the pieces of art themselves, there were no facts to 
dispute.393  Both cases called for judicial analysis of whether the allegedly 
infringing work was a parody of the original, and both cases involved works 
in genres—rap music and contemporary art, respectively394—that may not 
have been easily accessible to sitting judges.  Given the collective 
background of the Justices reviewing Campbell, it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that they may not have been the intended audience of 2 Live Crew’s 
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 393. See supra Part I.D.1–2. 
 394. See supra Part I.D.1–2. 
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recording and therefore less able to evaluate the “purpose and character of 
the use.”395  In this case, however, Justice Breyer and the Court recognized 
the artistic merit of 2 Live Crew’s composition.396  In contrast, the Second 
Circuit held against Koons,397 who was (and is) a divisive figure in the 
contemporary art world.398  A conversation about the worthiness of his art 
already existed,399 and Second Circuit judges were not necessarily the most 
qualified viewers to weigh in on this debate.  The Koons decision was 
particularly poorly received, with one critic commenting that “if copyright 
law won, then art lost.”400 
The Scott decision was a natural progression from courts’ consistent use 
of musical and visual records.  Because the “objective reasonableness” of 
an officer’s conduct is a question of law reserved for the court, a case can 
only go to trial if the court finds the officer’s actions objectively 
unreasonable, or if genuine disputes of material fact exist upon which a 
court finds that a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.401  By holding 
in Scott that the evidence must be viewed in the light depicted by the video, 
the Court made it easier to decide these cases pretrial, because it gave courts 
permission to view the video directly and conclude that there are no genuine 
disputes based on their own perceptions of the events and therefore no need 
to proceed to trial.402  Plumhoff followed in Scott’s footsteps, and although 
the Court’s opinion did not comment on the use of the video in making the 
decision, its language spoke definitively.403  The Court held that the driving 
was “obviously reckless” and that Rickard was “obviously pushing down 
the accelerator,” both conclusions considered points of dispute to the lower 
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courts.404  Further, the oral arguments support the idea that the Court relied 
on the video to inform their decision, albeit without specifying what the 
Court found especially compelling or convincing about the video 
footage.405 
C.   Problems with Judicial Review of Audiovisual Evidence 
This Note asserts that the bottom line is that appellate judicial review of 
audiovisual evidence is anything but the objective, neutral solution to 
divisive, fact-bound, and problematic cases that courts tout it to be.  As the 
scholarship of Dellinger, Kahan and co-authors, and Mezey has shown, 
viewers bring their own cultural, personal, and experiential filters to 
viewing audiovisual evidence.406  Not only are these biased perceptions 
difficult to overcome, but they are especially dangerous because they are 
often undetectable to the people holding them,407 including appellate 
judges.  As Dellinger points out, judges educated in the law have been 
taught to interpret and dissect briefs and oral arguments and therefore 
approach these tools of advocacy with a healthy skepticism and with legal 
knowledge of their own.408  Yet when it comes to an audiovisual record, it 
is very difficult to overcome the deeply ingrained adages that “seeing is 
believing,” and the power of seeing through one’s “own eyes” or hearing 
with one’s “own ears” is approached with little suspicion.409  As Kahan and 
his coauthors note, although people tend to be aware of other individuals’ 
cognitive biases, they do not perceive these biases in themselves.410  
Judges’ beliefs in their own infallible powers of perception forces the 
conversation back to a need to acknowledge who, as a whole, make up the 
judiciary, and how such a composition may skew results in favor of one 
party or another.  Appellate judges are not necessarily representative of 
society at large or of the jury pool.411 
Direct judicial review results in two major problems.  First, when judges 
view the video directly and draw inferences and conclusions from it, they 
are putting themselves in the role of the jury.  On top of the constitutional 
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problems with this, noted extensively by Professor Thomas,412 this prevents 
the jury from functioning as it should:  bringing together people from a 
variety of backgrounds and perspectives and giving all jurors the 
opportunity to voice their opinions and concerns, as posited by Kahan and 
his coauthors.413  The second problem stemming from direct judicial review 
is that judges do not approach audiovisual evidence with the visual literacy 
explained by Professor Mezey.414  The judiciary seems to be not just 
unaware of their own biases and preferences and the power of video to 
produce powerful emotional responses, but also its potential malleability.415  
Although video is becoming increasingly prevalent in daily life and in law 
enforcement activities, the judiciary is not becoming any more adept at 
navigating audiovisual evidence with the scrutiny and legal tools that it uses 
when approaching other, more traditional forms of evidence.416 
Looking at the particular problems that direct judicial review of 
audiovisual evidence creates, the civil rights plaintiff would seem to be in 
an especially disfavored position.  The 1986 trilogy encouraged courts to 
grant defendants’ motions—certainly Arnstein and Adickes would not go to 
trial today.  Additionally, the qualified immunity analysis also heavily 
favors the officer defendant.417  Finally, when audiovisual evidence is in the 
record, appellate judges—and thus far the Supreme Court has confirmed 
this hypothesis418—may be more likely to view the evidence in favor of the 
defendant officers.  With all of these factors weighing in the defendant’s 
favor, it would be important for courts to determine instances where an 
unfavorable inference should be drawn against the defendant, for example, 
if a police officer has video capability to record activity and chooses not to.  
The issues raised by judicial review of audiovisual evidence at summary 
judgment are not going away, and this Note advocates that the courts strive 
to address the parameters of its use.  It is simply not the case that video 
“speaks for itself.” 
A final illustration of audiovisual evidence’s power of persuasion comes 
from the oral arguments in Plumhoff before the Supreme Court.419  The 
Court challenged defense counsel regarding whether it was clearly 
established law that a police officer could shoot at a suspect fleeing in a 
vehicle.420  Before defense counsel could reply, Justice Scalia—perhaps in 
jest—said:  “My goodness, they do it all the time.  You watch the movies 
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about bank robberies, you know, it happens all the time.  Are these movies 
unrealistic?”421 
When a Supreme Court Justice cites his experience in a movie theater to 
question the propriety of a police officer’s actions, it is time to reevaluate 
the use of video in court proceedings and challenge its credibility—and the 
experiences that we bring with us as viewers—as we would with any other 
piece of evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note proposes that the Court decided Tolan and Plumhoff as it did 
because in Tolan, the evidence was purely testimonial, while in Plumhoff, 
an audiovisual record was available to the Court.  Precedent shows that 
deciding Plumhoff based on this audiovisual evidence was perfectly 
allowable, and even preferable in some judges’ opinions. 
However, reconciling the cases in this manner leads to a bigger problem 
in need of examination:  the propriety of direct appellate judicial review of 
audiovisual evidence.  This Note proposes that judges must undergo further 
education regarding the near impossibility of experiencing audiovisual 
evidence objectively, as well as audiovisual evidence’s malleability.  
Finally, this Note concludes that more often than not, a jury should view the 
audiovisual evidence, bringing to this purported objective evidence a 
variety of viewpoints and perspectives.  When judges view the audiovisual 
evidence directly and use this evidence to decide a case on its merits at the 
pretrial stage, they risk infringing on the jury’s rightful place in the 
litigation process. 
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